Should President Tsai Visit Taiping Island?

The Storm Media Editorial, March 19, 2024

 

Amid the volatile situation in the South China Sea, concerns have emerged as a new pier on Taiping Island (Itu Aba), costing NT$1.7 billion (about US$53 million), is set for inauguration. There is speculation about President Tsai Ing-wen visiting the island before the end of her tenure, following the precedent set by former presidents Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou, who both touted initiatives for the South China Sea during office. Given the geopolitical significance, should President Tsai visit Taiping Island to assert sovereignty?

 

Is It Necessary to Visit the Island?

 

Over the past eight years, green-leaning think tanks have suggested leasing Taiping Island to the US military, with support from Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators, but the Tsai administration has not acted on this. With the new pier on Taiping Island set to open, lawmakers from both the Kuomintang (KMT) and DPP have differing opinions on whether President Tsai should visit. Deputy Speaker Johnny Chiang of the Legislative Yuan has urged President Tsai to visit the island and assert sovereignty before leaving office. However, some in the DPP argue that many previous presidents never visited Taiping Island. These include Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, even President Lee Teng-hui, who formulated policy guidelines on the South China Sea during his tenure and withdrew the Marine Corps from the island before leaving office. Thus, they suggest that President Tsai does not need to follow in the footsteps of former presidents Chen and Ma.

 

Amidst the complex and changing situation in the South China Sea, warships from China, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Australia, and Germany navigate the area. In early 2023, an American naval vessel even sailed within nine nautical miles of Taiping Island, openly challenging our sovereignty. In the evolving landscape of international law, there's a competition between two sets of laws regarding the South China Sea issue: the traditional territorial claim based on history and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which measures maritime claims from territorial assertions. The South China Sea is where these two intersect and clash. China advocates for the old discourse based on history, while the United States, the Philippines, and other countries support the new narrative of UNCLOS.

 

Communist China's assertion of the "nine-dashed line" is a continuation of the "U-dashed line" (eleven-dashed line) traditional narrative by the Republic of China (R.O.C.). The mainland’s discourse on South China Sea sovereignty, from Zheng He's Ming Dynasty maritime charts to the Qing Dynasty Guangyu maps, and later the "U-dashed line" depicted by the R.O.C. government in its map of islands in the South China Sea has turned into to the "nine-dashed line" claimed by the People's Republic of China (PRC) after its establishment, all based on the "historic rights theory," claiming that the South China Sea islands have belonged to China since ancient times. Despite China signing the UNCLOS in 1996, it claims that issues such as maritime boundary delimitation and historical bays are beyond the scope of compulsory settlement under UNCLOS.

 

Noisy Claimants

 

However, the international arbitration case brought by the Philippines is not about the sovereignty of the South China Sea islands but rather about determining whether these entities are islands or rocks. If China only had rocks and not islands in the South China Sea, the sovereignty claim of the "nine-dashed line" would collapse. Behind this technical South China Sea arbitration case is the international political struggle between China and the United States. China’s claim is based on history with clear records, while the American position is based on international maritime law to ensure freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea.

 

Taiwan's stance is rather awkward, caught between the two major powers. The Tsai administration has adopted a strategy of ambiguity and has been relatively passive regarding its South China Sea policy. In July 2016, it emphasized an "absolute rejection of the South China Sea arbitration case" and reiterated that "the sovereignty of the South China Sea islands and their surrounding waters belongs to the R.O.C." President Tsai and the DPP’s policy towards Taiping Island is to utilize it for maritime rescue and scientific research purposes, with no intention of asserting rights in the South China Sea through military or quasi-military means. However, whenever tensions arise in the South China Sea, President Tsai almost always prioritizes U.S. concerns, thus oscillating between China's claim based on history and the American position based on international maritime law, fearing to offend either party.

 

From this perspective, if President Tsai chooses not to visit Taiping Island during her tenure, her main consideration would be the attitude and position of the United States. While the United States and its allies have repeatedly emphasized the importance of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in recent years, they have avoided direct conflict with China to prevent a repeat of the Hainan Island aircraft collision incident. However, the South China Sea remains a battleground for proxy conflicts between China and the United States. In early March, a collision occurred between a Filipino civilian vessel and a Chinese coast guard vessel, escalating tensions in the South China Sea to recent highs. In the tumultuous game of the South China Sea, Taiwan, with its awkward position, is akin to the Qing government during the Russo-Japanese War, only able to declare neutrality and helplessly remain "a clear-minded bystander."

 

Utilizing Leverage to Safeguard Sovereignty

 

Taiwan's role in the South China Sea issue is crucial, not only because Taiwan actually controls Taiping Island, the largest natural island in the South China Sea, but also because the P.R.C. "nine-dashed line" inherits the R.O.C. "U-dashed line," which is an important bargaining chip in negotiations with the Chinese mainland. Before stepping down, former President Ma established three key points in the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and East China Sea, anchoring stability in East Asia. When the R.O.C. (Taiwan) president visits national territory to assert sovereignty, it is not only a matter of defending national sovereignty but also of peace in the South China Sea. However, the United States is not keen on Taiwan's involvement in the South China Sea issue, so will President Tsai really visit Taiping Island?

 

Amid the U.S.-China rivalry in the South China Sea, pressing President Tsai to visit Taiping Island is of little significance. Unfortunately, the DPP’s ideology has always focused solely on Taiwan's main island, showing no concern for the sovereignty of outlying islands. The South China Sea policy could have been the best opportunity for the Tsai administration to rebuild cross-strait relations. However, this administration has always regarded the United States as its foremost concern. Any misstep could worsen the current fragile cross-strait relations and entangle Taiwan in the intractable South China Sea disputes.

 

From: https://www.storm.mg/article/5057290?mode=whole

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